2010: Advocates of worst-case scenarios will be biggest losers

The Nation: 07/01/2010

WE DON'T NEED a rocket scientist or a political pundit - or even a famous astrologer - to predict a year of continuing political tension or even turbulence for Thailand.


Considering all the potentially explosive issues awaiting this government this year, hurling negative forecasts is the easy part. In fact, there seems to be fierce competition among the forecasters to see who can produce a more frightening worst-case scenario.

The more challenging task, however, is how anyone can come up with a scenario whereby none - or only part - of the "bad news" will actually materialise. You can call me a hopelessly optimistic observer. But I see in every bad scenario the "window of loss" - not opportunity - for one or more of the major protagonists. In other words, there is no such thing as a zero-sum game for all the parties concerned in this prolonged confrontation.

To start with, the first time-bomb for Premier Abhisit Vejjajiva this year will be the possible break-up of the coalition over the proposed charter amendment. Some coalition partners have already threatened to go their own way if the Democrats refuse to go along with their proposed changes.

The other looming explosive issue is the upcoming court decision on whether to confiscate Thaksin Shinawatra's Bt76 billion in assets. The former PM's supporters have indicated that chaos will break out if the verdict goes against him.

The third major incendiary issue in the first few weeks of this year is whether the Election Commission will decide to disband the Democrat Party. A negative ruling could have some serious repercussions on the political landscape.

The fourth potentially divisive conflict is whether PM Abhisit will reshuffle the Cabinet - and if so, how to do it to genuinely improve the administration's performance rather than just to satisfy his own party's and the coalition partners' demands for portfolios in return for political loyalty.

These aren't the only time-bombs ready to blow the government into pieces. Other "accidents" could happen, and any one of the contingencies could plunge the roller-coaster political scene into an uncontrollable downwards spiral.

But, believe it or not, none of these potential political disasters has to necessarily come to pass - for a very simple reason: Those who think they stand to benefit from a crisis of their own making may have second thoughts before they set their plot in motion.

Here are some of the questions to raise to deflate speculation that all these terrible thing will happen to plunge Thailand into another year of living dangerously and disastrously.

1. Does Thaksin really think he can come back to Thailand this year (first he said "middle of the year", then changed it to "next New Year") as a free man? How does he escape the two-year jail term and how does he lobby to ensure that his assets remain intact?

2. Do the coalition partners really think they can join with Thaksin's Pheu Thai Party to topple Abhisit? Do Thaksin and his lieutenants trust them after what has happened in the past year?

3. Can Abhisit be sure he will be able to "muddle through" another year of compromises with all the pressure groups that could make or break his power base?

It's clear that none of the parties involved in the ongoing confrontation - including the military establishment - is strong enough to be in a position to call the shots.

As things stand now, a coup to enhance either party's position is out of the question. Therefore the so-called "coup threat" can't be used by any group of contenders to put an end to the confrontation. The Army, in brief, can't trigger a change the way it wants anymore.

Thaksin doesn't have the decisive say in how things should develop either. Support isn't there for a "popular uprising" to effect drastic changes - as envisioned by some of Thaksin's apparatchiks. He can stir the pot. He can radicalise and galvanise the red shirts. But he can't lead the charge and seize power the way he wants.

Thaksin may think he can "use" some of the red-shirt core leaders to enable him to return to power, but, in effect, those acting on his behalf now may just be exploiting his money and influence for their personal benefit.

But that doesn't mean Abhisit is in command of the situation. He will continue to preside over a divided nation, and his attempt at national reconciliation will falter. He won't be able to neutralise Thaksin's influence - and the coalition partners will, short of breaking away, hold him hostage to get what they want.

One possible unconventional conclusion is therefore: If you believe the worst-case forecasts because the pundits think those intent on creating trouble will only stand to gain, then think again.

The troublemakers may have come to realise that they aren't necessarily the winners in this game. In fact, those who think they can mess things up at will, may end up being the biggest losers